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CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF FAMILY
The burden cast upon society of caring for so many of its
indigent members should lead to a reconsideration of laws mak-
ing specific members responsible for particular individuals. Strict
compliance with laws creating a legal duty of support where
a moral duty already exists could alleviate the situation to an
appreciable degree.
Our legislators have seen fit to make it a crime for a husband
to desert or intentionally fail to support a wife in destitute or
necessitous circumstances.1 If either parent deserts or wilfully
neglects to support a minor child, the parent is guilty of criminal
neglect of family. Commission of this misdemeanor results in
a fine of not over five hundred dollars or imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both. The court may in its discretion
direct that the payment be made to the dependent.2
However, the interpretation given by the Louisiana Supreme
Court to prior statutory provisions very similar to Article 74 of
the Louisiana Criminal Code has left much to be desired. Pro-
cedural impediments have prevented the statute from serving
its obvious purpose.
In State v. Fick 3 the Louisiana Supreme Court said:
located about 150 feet from the school building. The students had been
warned of the danger, and teachers were on the schopl grounds supervis-
ing the children, which safeguard the court considered ample. The court also
noted that the school had been in operation for 15 years "and yet no one
ever had any apprehension or fear about this stream running by the school
ground." (43 So.(2d) 47, 51.) But the court clearly based its decision on the
ground that the ditch was a natural condition of the land declaring that
in each of the cases relied upon by the plaintiff (including Saxton v. Plum
Orchards, Inc., 215 La. 378, 40 So.(2d) 791 [1949]) the "attractive nuisance"
was created by the defendants, while in this case the defendants neither
created the ditch nor had anything to do with its presence.
Of the Saxton case, the court said, "(It) makes no radical change in our
jurisprudence; it merely applies the long recognized principles to the pecu-
liar facts of the case," a view that the writer submits is substantiated by a
careful analysis of the attractive nuisance doctrine in Louisina.
1. Art. 74, La. Crim. Code of 1942 [La. R.S. (1950) § 14:74):
"Criminal neglect of family is the desertion or intentional nonsupport:
"(1) By a husband of his wife who is in destitute or necessitous cir-
cumstances; or
"(2) By either parent of his minor child who is in destitute or neces-
sitous circumstances.
"Whoever commits the offense of criminal neglect of family shall be
fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than
one year, or both; and if a fine should be imposed, the court may direct it
to be paid in whole or in part to the wife, or to the tutor or custodian of
the minor child or children, or to an organization or individual approved
by the court as fiduciary for such wife or child."
2. Ibid.
3. 140 La. 1063, 74 So. 554 (1917).
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"We take it, however, that the offense of deserting and wil-
fully neglecting to provide for the support of a wife and
child, as denounced by the act of 1902, 4 is committed, not at
that place to which the deserted wife and child may be com-
pelled to go, by reason of such desertion and neglect, in
order to obtain the means of livelihood, but at the place
where the husband is to be found, when and so long as, his
desertion and neglect continues: for it is the desertion and
neglect that constitutes the offense, and not the being de-
serted and neglected." 5
In State v. Hopkins6 the defendant left his wife and minor
child in Jefferson Davis Parish and went to the State of Wash-
ington, later returning to Louisiana but residing in Lafayette
Parish. The court held that while he was out of the state he
could have committed no crime against the laws of Louisiana
since this state had no jurisdiction over him at that time, and
for the period he resided in Lafayette Parish he could not be
prosecuted in Jefferson Davis Parish because the venue of the
crime was where the defendant was physically present. Con-
versely, in State v. Baurens7 the defendant excepted to the juris-
diction at his domicile, St. Bernard Parish, because the destitute
wife and child had left him and gone to New Orleans. The court
rejected this argument by saying that the proper venue was the
domicile of the defendant and that this could not be changed by
the removal of the wife and child. The position taken by the
court in these cases has been consistently followed.8
As a result of this judicial interpretation, effective prose-
cution for desertion and non-support has become exceedingly
difficult. The prosecuting officer of the place to which the de-
fendant has moved may not be especially interested in the case,
as the destitute persons are not wards of a welfare agency or
public charity of his locality; he does not actually see the con-
dition of the parties in destitute and necessitous circumstances;
and there is no local public pressure brought to demand proesc-
tion of the matter.
The majority of the American states, proceeding under stat-
4. This was superseded by La. Act 77 of 1932, which is substantially
the same as Art. 74, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
5. 140 La. 1063, 1068, 74 So. 554, 555 (1917).
6. 171 La. 919, 132 So. 501 (1931).
7. 117 La. 136, 41 So. 442 (1906).
8. State v. Clark, 144 La. 328, 80 So. 578 (1918); State v. Smith, 145 La.
914, 83 So. 189 (1919); State v. Morel, 146 La. 6, 83 So. 318 (1919).
[VOL. X
COMMENTS
utes strikingly similar to Article 74 and the Uniform Desertion
and Nonsupport Act, allow prosecution for the offense in the
jurisdiction where the wife or child becomes dependent, regard-
less of the defendant's nonresidence.9 It has been held that if a
father who has never been a resident of a jurisdiction permits
his minor child to be brought into that jurisdiction, and knowing
him to be in destitute conditions, fails to provide for him, he is
subject to prosecution in that jurisdiction. 10 Where the wife,
because of mistreatment, has taken the children to another juris-
diction where their condition becomes destitute, the court has
held:
"If as a result of his wrongdoing they were obliged to leave
him and seek refuge elsewhere, the circumstances that they
found shelter in a state which undertakes to punish the
neglect of parental duty under such circumstances,... im-
posed upon him no hardship of which he has any standing
to complain.""
If it is desired to change the effect of the Louisiana decisions
by legislative action, such could be best accomplished by extend-
ing the rule of Article 16 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure12 to cover specifically the crime of desertion and nonsup-
port. The following is an example of the type of provision pos-
sible:
Art. 16.1. When any person shall desert or intentionally
not support his family in violation of Art. 74 of the Criminal
Code, the offense may be prosecuted and punished:
(1) In the parish where the person owing the duty of
support resides; or
(2) In the parish where the person (or persons) to
9. 27 Am. Jur. 47, § 444: "He is properly indicted and tried for the of-
fense [of nonsupport and desertion] in the jurisdiction where the wife or
child becomes dependent, regardless of his nonresidence, for that is the
place where -the duty of support should be discharged, and consequently
the place where the offense of failure to support is committed."
10. In re Fowles, 89 Kan. 430, 131 Pac. 598 (1913). Here the question
of extradition was not raised as the defendant had entered the state on
unrelated business and the court obtained jurisdiction over him at that
time.
11. State v. Wellman, 102 Kan. 503, 170 Pac. 1052, Ann. Cas. 1918D 1006,
L.R.A. 1918D 949 (1918).
12. Art. 16, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928 [La. R.S. (1950) § 15:16]:
"If any mortal wound shall be given, or other violence or injury shall be
inflicted or poison administered on the high seas, or in any other navigable
waters, or on land, without the limits of this state, by means whereof death
shall ensue in any parish thereof, such offenses may be prosecuted and pun-
ished in the parish where such death shall have ensued."
1/ 1950]
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whom the duty of support is owed establishes a bona fide
residence; provided that this provision shall be effective
only if the person to whom the duty of support was owed
was justified in establishing a separate residence.13
It is felt that an amendment of this type to Article 16 would to
a great extent alleviate the present situation and also lead to a
fuller and more effective enforcement of Article 74.
However, such a provision would not solve the problem
where the person owing the duty of support goes to another
state and subsequently fails intentionally to support the person
or persons to whom he owes the duty. United States constitu-
tiona1 4 and statutory15 provisions require the governor of the
state to whom an extradition demand is presented to determine,
before he can lawfully comply with it, "that the person de-
manded is substantially charged with a crime against the laws
of the state from whose justice he is alleged to have fled ... ;
and second, that the person demanded is a fugitive from the jus-
tice of the state the executive authority of which makes the
demand. ' 6
"To be a fugitive from justice, in the sense of the Act of
Congress regulating the subject under consideration, it is not
necessary that the party charged should have left the State in
which the crime is alleged to have been committed after an
indictment found, or for the purpose of avoiding a prosecution
anticipated or begun, but simply that having within a State com-
mitted that which by its laws constitutes a crime, when he is
sought to be subjected to its criminal process to answer for his
offense, he has left its jurisdiction and is found within the terri-
tory of another.1 1 It necessarily follows from this decision and
many others" that unless the accused incurs some guilt in the
13. The type of provision in (2) could be held constitutional under the
theory that a substantial element of the crime occurred in the parish where
the duty of support is owed.
14. U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 2: "A person charged in any State with
Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found
in another State, shall on demand of the executive authority of the State
from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime."
15. Rev. Stat. § 5278, 5279 (1873), 18 U.S.C.A. § 662 (1927).
16. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 95, 6 S.Ct. 291, 299, 29 L.Ed. 544, 549
(1885). Accord: Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127, 36 S.Ct. 290, 60 L.Ed. 562 (1916),
alffirming 77 Tex. Crim. Rep. 351, 173 S.W. 291, L.R.A. 1916C 1251 (1915).
17. 116 U.S. 80, 97, 6 S.Ct. 291, 300, 29 L.Ed. 544, 549 (1885).
18. Hyatt v. Cockran, 188 U.S. 691, 6 S.Ct. 291, 29 L.Ed. 544 (1902); Ex
parte Hoffstot, 218 U.S. 665,37 S.Ct. 222, 54 L.Ed. 1201 (1910), affirming 180
Fed. 240 (D.C. N.Y. 1910); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285, 31 S.Ct.
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demanding state prior to his removal therefrom he cannot be
said to be a fugitive from justice and hence cannot be extradited.
Other states are still faced with this problem. Numerous
cases hold that a man who furnishes adequate support while
within a particular state, but after leaving it fails to continue the
support, is not, with respect to the offense of nonsupport, a
fugitive from the justice of the state where the deserted wife or
child remains, and is not subject to extradition.19 However, the
temporary presence within the state by one charged with neglect
to support his wife or children, although for an innocent purpose,
is sufficient to charge him with being a fugitive from justice
upon his departure again from the state.20
In view of the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence 2 1
on this point, it seems that this interpretation will remain, re-
gardless of its merits.
A liberal and logical interpretation of the desertion provision
of Article 74 of the Criminal Code might cover the situation to
a large degree. Black defines desertion as "The act by which a
person abandons and forsakes, without justification, or unauthor-
ized, a station or condition of public or social life, renouncing
its responsibilities and evading its duties. ' 22 It logically follows
that if a person within the provisions of Article 74 should desert
one in destitute or necessitous circumstances to whom the duty
is owed, the crime of desertion would occur at the place the
defendant left. This would not only allow prosecution at the
former family domicile but would allow extradition in the event
the defendant absconded into another state. The dicta in the case
of State v. Fick2 3 indicates that the supreme court may interpret
the desertion provision to the contrary. However, when it be-
comes necessary for the court to face squarely the issue, a re-
consideration could easily lead to a different result.
558, 560, 55 L.Ed. 735 (1910); Ex parte Graham, 216 Fed. 813 (D.C. Calif. 1913);
Taft v. Lord, 92 Conn. 539, 103 Atl. 644, L.R.A. 1918E 545 (1918).
19. Taft v. Lord, 92 Conn. 539, 103 Atl. 644, L.R.A. 1918E 545 (1918); Re
Kuhns, 36 Nev. 487, 137 Pac. 83, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 507 (1913); Re Roberson,
38 Nev. 326, 149 Pac. 182, L.R.A. 1915E 691 (1915).
20. 22 Am. Jur. 261 (1939); Chase v. State, 93 Fla. 963, 113 So. 103, 54
A.L.R. 271 (1927); People ex rel. Gottschalk v. Brown, 237 N.Y. 483, 143
N.E. 653, 32 A.L.R. 1164 (1924). Notes (1924) 32 A.L.R. 1167, (1928) 54 A.L.R.
281.
21. See cases cited in note 19, supra.
22. Black, Law Dictionary (3 ed. 1933) 565.




1. Article 74 of the Criminal Code, as interpreted, does not
result in a full accomplishment of the desired end, that is, sup-
port of a family by the husband or wife charged with that re-
sponsibility.
2. An amendment, similar to the one suggested, should lead
to more effective enforcement of Article 74 of the Criminal
Code. This would allow prosecution either at the domicile of the
person owing the duty of support or at the justifiably estab-
lished residence of the person to whom the duty of support is
owed.
3. The restrictions on extradition impair the effectiveness of
such a provision where the husband goes to another state. There
seems to be little that can be done about this in strictly non-
support cases.
4. A liberal interpretation of the desertion provision of
Article 74 would achieve a desirable result in those cases where
the husband's intent could be shown at the time he left. This
would
a. Allow prosecution for desertion at the former family
domicile, and,
b. Allow extradition in the event the defendant left the
state as he would then be a fugitive from justice.
GILLIS W. LONG
IMPROPER REMARKS OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Article 381 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states the
general rule that "Counsel may argue to the jury both the law
and the evidence of the case, but must confine themselves to
matters as to which evidence has been received; and counsel
shall refrain from any appeal to prejudice."1  A survey of the
jurisprudence indicates that some improper remarks are held
1. This article, as written, applies to defense counsels as well as pros-
ecuting attorneys. Obviously, in a criminal trial, counsel for the defendant
cannot make such an appeal to prejudice as would cause the verdict to
be set aside on appeal. If the jury or court errs in being swayed by the
prejudicial appeals of defense counsel and the result is an acquittal for the
accused, the matter is settled, for the principle of double jeopardy pre-
vents an appeal by the state. Due process of law demands that the defendant
have a fair trial, and errors in the proceedings of a criminal trial that
prejudice this right of the accused result in the denial of due process. The
converse of this is not true; mistakes in the trial that result in the acquittal
of the defendant are not reversible errors. See State v. Schiro, 143 La. 841,
79 So. 426 (1918).
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